This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for potential competitors on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect industry dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique equilibrium with last-in first-out expectations: a firm never exits before a younger rival does. When an industry can support at most two firms, we prove that raising barriers to a second producer's entry increases the probability that some firm will serve the industry and decreases its long-run entry and exit rates. In numerical examples with more than two firms, imposing a barrier to entry stabilizes industry structure. 
Introduction
This paper determines the effects of raising late entrants' sunk costs in the model of oligopolistic industry dynamics presented in a companion paper (Abbring and Campbell, 2006) . A random number of customers demands the industry's services, and this demand state evolves stochastically. Entry possibly requires paying a sunk cost, and continued operation incurs fixed costs. The wish to avoid these per-period fixed costs in markets that are no longer profitable motivates firms to exit. We assume that all participants rationally expect exit decisions to follow a last-in first-out pattern. That is, no firm produces after the exit of an older competitor. Two considerations motivate this focus. First, it embodies (in an extreme way) the widespread observation that young firms exit more frequently than their older counterparts. Second, such expectations themselves lower entrants' profits and raise incumbents' profits; so we expect incumbents to use any available means to shift common expectations in this direction.
In a companion paper to this one, Abbring and Campbell (2006) prove that there exists an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium with last-in first-out expectations, and they provide a simple procedure for its calculation. These results allow us to compare industry dynamics with different sunk costs of entry. Our analysis firsts considers the case where at most two producers serve the industry, which we call the duopoly case. This yields an analytic characterization of the effects of barriers to entry. We prove that raising a second entrant's sunk cost reduces both the probability of two firms operating and the probability that the industry is unserved by any firm. The first effect is the expected entry deterrence. The second effect reflects the positive influence of barriers to entry on the value of being a monopolist, and it is familiar from the static analysis of patents and innovation. We also show that raising the second entrant's sunk costs reduces average entry and exit rates. In this specific sense, barriers to entry stabilize industry structure.
Because calculating the model's equilibrium with three or more firms requires only a few seconds on a standard personal computer, we can complement these results with hundreds of numerical examples of raising barriers to entry in industries with more than two firms. In them, the indirect entry-encouraging effect of raising later entrants' sunk costs is small, so raising barriers to entry always reduces the average number of firms. We also find that the standard deviation of the number of firms nearly always falls with a barrier to entry.
The term "barrier to entry" has a rich and confusing history. McAfee et al. (2004) review the many definitions proposed for it and conclude that none of them are useful for antitrust analysis. They offer new definition:
An economic barrier to entry is a cost that must be incurred by a new entrant and that incumbents do not or have not had to incur.
The barrier to entry we consider satisfies this. Carlton (2004) believes that the confusion surrounding "barriers to entry" arises from previous analysts' failure to explicitly account for industry dynamics. In this paper, we embed a cost asymmetry in a fully-specified model of industry dynamics with uncertainty. With this, we characterize the "medium-run" response of industry outcomes to raising a barrier to entry.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model's primitives and derives the effects of barriers to entry for a specific example with a penciland-paper equilibrium solution. Section 3 presents the analysis of the general model, and Section 4 shows that our primary results also arise in a modified version of the pencil-andpaper example with first-in-first-out (FIFO) expectations. Section 5 explains the relationship between our work and existing papers on entry deterrence and competitive industry dynamics, and Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
The Model
The model consists of a single oligopolistic market in discrete time t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. There is a large number of firms that are potentially active in the market. We index these firms by N. At time 0, N 0 = 0 firms are active. Entry and subsequent exit of firms determines the number of active firms N t in each later period. The number of consumers in the market, C t , evolves stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on the interval [Ĉ,Č] . Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events and actions within a period. It begins with the inherited values of N t and C t−1 . First, all participants observe the realization of C t . Then, all active firms receive profits equal to (C t /N t ) × π(N t ) − κ. Here, each firm serves C t /N t customers, and π(N t ) is the producer surplus earned from each one. The term κ > 0 represents fixed costs of production.
After serving the market, active firms decide whether they will remain so. These decisions are sequential and begin with the oldest firm. After this, any remaining firms make the same decision in the order of their entry. If firm i is active, then R i t denotes its rank in this sequence. Exit is costless but irreversible and allows the firm to avoid future periods' fixed production costs.
After active firms' continuation decisions, those firms that have not yet had an opportunity to enter make entry decisions in the order of their names. The cost of entry potentially
Go to next period with (N t+1 , C t ). We denote this cost with ϕ(N ), and we assume that it is weakly increasing in N . When ϕ(N ) > ϕ(N − 1), we say that the N 'th firm faces a barrier to entry. We do not model the actions that incumbents or policy makers take to impose these costs. The payoff to staying out of the industry is always zero, because a firm with an entry opportunity cannot defer the option. The period ends when some potential entrant decides to stay out of the industry. Both active firms' and potential entrants' decisions maximize their expected stream of profits discounted with a factor β.
Markov-perfect equilibrium
We choose as our equilibrium concept symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. When firm i decides whether to stay or exit, N t − R i t (the number of active firms following it in the sequence), C t , and R i t+1 (its rank in the next period's sequence of active firms) are available and payoff-relevant. Collect these into
). Similarly, the payoffrelevant state to a potential entrant is H it ≡ (C t , R i t+1 ). Note that H it takes its values in H S ≡ N × Ĉ ,Č × N for firms active in period t and in H E ≡ Ĉ ,Č × N for potential entrants. Here and below, we use S and E to denote survivors and entrants.
A Markov strategy for firm i is a pair (A i S (H S ), A i E (H E )) for each H S ∈ H S and H E ∈ H E . These represent the probability of being active in the next period given that the firm is currently active (A i S (·)) and given that the firm has an entry opportunity (A i E (·)). A symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all firms follow the same Markov strategy.
When firms use Markov strategies, the payoff-relevant state variables determine an active firm's expected discounted profits, which we denote with v(H S ). In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, this satisfies the Bellman equation
Here and throughout, we adopt conventional notation and denote the variable corresponding to X in the next period with X . In Equation (1), the expectation of N is calculated using all firms' strategies conditional on the particular firm of interest choosing to be active. Although firms make their continuation and entry decisions sequentially, the game's infinite horizon removes the standard argument for uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium. Abbring and Campbell (2006) show that uniqueness of equilibrium can be restored by focusing only on symmetric equilibria in which an older firm's first-mover advantage translates into longevity. By definition, firms in such an equilibrium follow a common Last In/First Out (LIFO) strategy. Definition 1. A LIFO strategy is a strategy (A S , A E ) such that A S (H S ) ∈ {0, 1}, A E (H E ) ∈ {0, 1}, and A S (N − R, C, R ) is weakly decreasing in R.
If all firms follow a common LIFO strategy, then one incumbent choosing to exit necessarily leads all younger incumbents to do the same.
Constructing a Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy is straightforward. Suppose that all firms do follow such a strategy. Because C is bounded above byČ, the number of firms serving the industry cannot exceed some upper bound,Ň . Consider the decisions of a firm entering withŇ − 1 firms already committed to produce in the next period. This firm will exit before any other, so the Bellman equation for R =Ň corresponds to a straightforward non-strategic exit decision. Its Bellman equation obviously has a unique fixed point, and we choose its associated optimal decision rule to form A S (0, C,Ň ) and A E (0, C,Ň ). If the firm is indifferent between activity and inactivity at some value of C, we choose the rule that defaults to inactivity. With this strategy in hand, we can consider the problem of a firm with rankŇ − 1. Maximizing its profit requires only expectations about the entry and exit of a firm with rankŇ , which are already in hand. Thus, standard dynamic programming arguments yield the unique value function satisfying the Bellman equation. With this, we can set A S (0, C,Ň − 1), A S (1, C,Ň − 1), and A E (0, C,Ň − 1) to the unique optimal decision rule that defaults to inactivity. Continuing recursively generates value functions for the remaining firms and completes the symmetric entry and continuation strategies.
It is clear from the construction of this equilibrium that it is the only one in a LIFO strategy that defaults to inactivity. We present a formal proof of this in Abbring and Campbell (2006) . As we mentioned in the paper's introduction, we find the restriction to LIFO strategies natural for the problem at hand, because it embodies in an extreme form the empirical regularity that young firms exit more frequently than their older counterparts and because these expectations make entry less profitable by placing incumbents in a privileged position. Because it is also powerful enough to select an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium, we impose it on our analysis.
A Pencil-and-Paper Example
If we assume that C t = C t−1 with probability 1 − λ and that it equals a draw from a uniform distribution on [Ĉ,Č] with the complementary probability, then we can calculate the model's equilibrium value functions and decision rules with pencil and paper. Before proceeding, we examine this special case to illustrate the model's moving parts. For further simplification, suppose that π(N ) = 0 for N ≥ 3, so at most two firms serve the industry. To ensure that the equilibrium dynamics are not trivial, we also assume that no firm will serve the industry if demand is low enough and that two firms will serve the industry if it is sufficiently high.
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To begin, consider an incumbent firm with rank 2. In an equilibrium in a LIFO strategy, its profit equals (C/2)π(2) − κ. It will earn this until the next time that C t changes, at which point the new demand value will be statistically independent of its current value. It is straightforward to use these facts to show that this firm's value function is the following piecewise linear function of C.
Here, v(0, 2) is the firm's average continuation value given a new draw of C t and C 2 is the largest value of C that satisfies v(0, C, 2) = 0. Optimality requires the firm to exit if C < C 2 . This value function is monotonic in C, so there is a unique entry threshold C 2 which equates the continuation value with the entry cost. Thus, a second duopolist enters whenever C t exceeds C 2 and exits if it subsequently falls at or below C 2 . Next, consider the problem of an incumbent with rank 1. If this firm is currently a monopolist, it expects to remain so until C t > C 2 ; and if it is currently a duopolist, it expects to become a monopolist when C t falls below C 2 . This firm's value function is also piecewise linear. If the firm begins the period as the sole incumbent, it is
and if it begins as one of two incumbents it equals The exit threshold C 1 is the greatest value of C such that v(0, C, 1) = 0, and the average continuation values following a change in C t for a monopolist and a duopolist are
This value function does not always increase with C, because slightly raising C from C 2 induces entry by the second firm and causes both current profits and the continuation value to discretely drop. Nevertheless we know that they drop to a value above ϕ(1), because at this point the second firm chooses to enter. Hence, it is still possible to find a unique entry threshold C 1 which equates the value of entering with rank 1 to the cost of doing so. Figure 2 visually represents the equilibrium. In each panel, C runs along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis gives the value of a firm at the time that entry and exit decisions are The value of a duopolist with rank 2 equals zero for C < C 2 , and thereafter increases linearly with C. The entry threshold C 2 equates this value with ϕ(2). The value of an older firm with rank 1 has two branches. The upper monopoly branch gives the value of a monopolist expecting no further entry. If C increases above C 2 and thus induces entry, the firm's value drops to the lower duopoly branch. This has the same slope as the value function in the lower panel. Its intercept is higher, because the incumbent expects to eventually become a monopolist the first time that C passes below C 2 .
2 When this occurs, the firm's value returns to the monopoly branch. The entry and exit thresholds for this firm occur where the monopoly branch intersects ϕ(1) and 0. Now turn to the effects of increasing ϕ(2) on this duopoly's dynamics. Figure 3 illustrates this exercise. If a second firm actually enters the market, then the entry cost has no impact on that firm's optimal exit decision or value function. The value function in the bottom panel is monotonic in C, so raising ϕ(2) directly increases C 2 . In this sense, raising ϕ(2) directly deters entry. The impact of this on an incumbent's value is clear. Both branches of the value function shift up, from the grey to the solid black, and this lowers both C 1 and C 1 . Intuitively, these changes lower the probability that either zero or two firms will serve the industry.
Entry and Exit Thresholds
In the pencil and paper example, higher realizations of demand weakly increase the number of firms serving the industry. In general, a greater realization of C t weakly increases N t+j for positive j for any subsequent realization of (C t+1 , . . . , C t+j ) if and only if there exists a set of entry thresholds C 1 , C 2 , . . . , CŇ and exit thresholds C 1 , C 2 , . . . , CŇ such that A E (C, R) = I{C > C R } and A S (N − R, C, R) = I{C > C R } If firms follow such a strategy, then the R'th firm enters when C t passes above C R and this firm remains active until C t falls below C R .
Weak monotonicity of the number of firms in demand is intuitively desirable, and the existence of such a threshold representation for firms' entry and continuation decisions clearly simplifies analysis. However, is not generally the case that the equilibrium strategy has a threshold representation. This is because higher realizations of C t increase both current profit and the likelihood of future entry. Thus, firms' value functions are not increasing in C t . In Abbring and Campbell (2006) we give an example where increasing C initially raises a potential first entrant's value above ϕ(1), but a further increase in C t pulls it back below ϕ(1). This firm chooses to enter for only intermediate values of C t , and there exists no threshold representation for its strategy.
In Abbring and Campbell (2006) , we show that if the stochastic process governing C t satisfies the following definition, then the equilibrium strategy has a threshold representation.
Definition 2. The transition function Q(·|C) is a mixture of uniform autoregressions with bounded growth if (i) there exists a sequence of transition functions
with both µ k (C) ≤ C +σ k /2 and µ k (C) weakly increasing in C; and (ii) there exists a sequence of positive real numbers p k such that lim K→∞ K k=1 p k = 1 and
In this definition, each of the mixing distributions is a (possibly nonlinear) autoregression with conditional mean µ k (C) and uniform innovations with variance σ 2 k /12. The coefficients p k give the mixing probabilities. The condition that µ k (C) ≤ C + σ k /2 ensures that the current state is always in or above the support of each mixing distribution. This is the sense in which Definition 2 bounds the growth of C. Definition 2 requires the distribution of C given C to have no modes to the right of C. Thus, increasing C cannot move a "substantial" probability mass over another firm's entry threshold. This mitigates the negative effects of the threat of future entry on a firm's current profit.
Barriers to Entry
Incumbents' attempts to deter contestants' entry occupy a central place in dynamic industrial organization. The relative simplicity of the present paper's model allows us to analytically characterize the effects of raising ϕ(2) for the case whereŇ = 2. We complement this qualitative analysis with a quantitative analysis of model parameterizations withŇ > 2.
The Duopoly Case
We proceed under the assumption thatŇ = 2 and that two firms serve the market in equilibrium with positive probability.
3 We are interested in the results of increasing ϕ(2).
Actions available to a real-world incumbent for doing so include bidding-up the price of fixed inputs, patent litigation, and the purchase of legal entry restrictions. We do not explicitly model the incumbent's choice of ϕ(2). Instead, we examine the impact of exogenously varying it for observable aspects of industry dynamics. We begin with the graphical results from Figure 3 . These generalize immediately, if Q(c|C) Definition 2 For the following proposition and the other analysis of the duopoly case, we assume that this is so. Proposition 1. Increasing ϕ(2) increases C 2 , leaves C 2 unchanged, and decreases both C 1 and C 1 .
Changing the incumbent's and contestant's threshold rules directly effects the evolution of the equilibrium number of firms. To see how, suppose that ϕ(2) increases unexpectedly and permanently when the industry begins with a particular value of C and no active producers. Entry of at least one firm occurs if and only if C > C 1 . So increasing a contestant's entry cost increases the probability that some firm will service the industry immediately. Suppose instead that the industry begins with a single active incumbent. Because C 1 decreases and C 2 increases, any value of C which induced neither entry nor exit will continue to do so. Hence, the probability of the industry remaining with exactly one firm increases. Finally, an industry that begins with two firms will remain unchanged in exactly the same conditions as before. The following proposition shows that this intuition extends to the hazard function for a change in the number of firms that conditions on given initial values of C and N .
probability that the number of firms remains unchanged over j periods given the initial values of C and N . Then, raising ϕ(2) decreases S j (C, 0), increases S j (C, 1), and leaves S j (C, 2) unchanged.
An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that imposing a barrier to entry makes the structure of an active industry more stable in the short and medium run. We now turn to consider the effects of the entry barrier on that structure itself. The impact of ϕ(2) on the equilibrium entry and exit thresholds strongly suggests that the probabilities of having 0 or 2 firms declines with ϕ(2). This is indeed the case
This proposition's content is straightforward: Imposing a barrier to a contestant's entry increases the probability that the industry is serviced at the possible expense of decreasing the probability of a "competitive" industry structure. The literature on entry barriers does not ordinarily associate them with increasing the number of firms, but this effect is familiar from the analysis of patents: Increasing the cost of a imitator's entry encourages entry by an innovator.
Proposition 3 characterizes the number of firms at any given date in the future. In this sense, they characterize the short-and medium-run responses to creating a barrier to entry. The following corollary extends its conclusions to the industry's ergodic distribution, if it exists. Corollary 1. Suppose that (C, N ) has a unique ergodic distribution and let P (N ) denote the probability of N firms serving the industry in this distribution. Then raising ϕ(2) decreases P (0) and P (2).
The omitted proof is an simple application of the bounded convergence theorem. By definition, the distribution of industry outcomes converges to the ergodic distribution as the time horizon grows large. However, this long-run differs substantially from the static analysis of industry structure which goes by the same label, because it gives a distribution of industry outcomes given ongoing uncertainty and sunk costs rather than a single outcome in a static model without these features.
We conclude this analytic characterization of the model's dynamics by considering the most familiar observable indicators of an industry's propensity to change its structure, its entry and exit rates. We define the net growth rate of the number of firms in the industry with G t ≡ 2 × (N t − N t−1 )/(N t + N t−1 ). With this, the industry's entry and exit rates are ER t ≡ min{0, G t } and XR t ≡ min{0, −G t }. Because these are only well defined if either N t or N t−1 is positive, we assume that C 1 <Č and C 1 =Ĉ. Given these conditions, the following proposition shows that raising ϕ 2 has the expected effect of reducing average entry and exit rates.
Proposition 4. Suppose that C 1 <Č, C 1 =Ĉ, and (C, N ) has a unique ergodic distribution. Then increasing ϕ(2) weakly decreases
The proof relies on the fact raising C 2 reduces P (2) and thereby all future dates' exit rates.
This completes the analytic characterization of the equilibrium for the case whereŇ = 2. Based on these results, our intuition suggests that raising barriers to entry generally increases the probability of the market being served by some firm and reduces entry and exit rates. Analytically demonstrating this with more than two firms is not straightforward, because an action that raises both ϕ(2) and ϕ(3) has both a direct entry-deterring effect on firm 2 and an indirect entry-encouraging effect on the same firm by discouraging a third firm's entry. To better understand the equilibrium impact of erecting barriers to entry in these more complex situations, we turn to a numerical exploration.
The Oligopoly Case
Numerical exploration of the effects of barriers to entry requires us to assign values to the model's parameters. Estimating or calibrating them necessitates a much richer exploration of a particular industry's institutional background and technological constraints than is appropriate for this paper. Instead, we follow the strategy advocated by Judd (1998) and calculate the model's equilibrium dynamics at hundreds of parameter choices. We then use these numerical results to gauge how well the propositions for the duopoly case characterize more complicated oligopoly settings.
Calculation of the model's equilibrium uses values for the parameters β and κ; the profit function π(N ), the cost of entry ϕ(N ), and the stochastic process for C. We suppose that a model period corresponds to five years and that the real interest rate is 5%, so we set β = 1.05
−5 for all of the model's parameterizations. We set the support of ln C to a grid of 301 evenly spaced points on [−1.5, 1.5] and we choose the stochastic process to approximate the linear autoregression ln C = ρ ln C + u, where u has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 . The approximation is a mixture over 51 conditional distributions for ln C with a uniform distribution with support width σ k and and conditional mean
A replication file (available at http://www.nber.org/ jrc/lifo) contains the details of their specification. Our calculations use three different values of ρ -0.80, 0.90, and 1.0 -and three values of σ -0.20, 0.30, and 0.40. Only the specification with ρ = 1 satisfies Definition 2, so our computational procedure does not require firms' entry and survival decisions to follow threshold rules. We normalize the per-period fixed cost κ to equal one. To begin, we suppose that the sunk cost of entry ϕ(N ) is the same for all potential entrants, and we allow it to take on three different values, 0, 1/5, and 2/5.
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The payoff function π(N ) reflects the static competition between operating oligopolists. We consider three different specifications for it. All of these use a unit-elastic industry demand curve. For the first specification, we suppose that firm's compete in prices with Logit Marshallian demand curves. The resulting profits are π(N ) = × N/(N − 1). The second specification supposes that firms compete in quantities. This implies that π(N ) = /N 2 . 5 The final case supposes that firms sell to two types of consumers. A fraction ψ can 4 The case with ϕ(N ) set to zero is not equivalent to the infinite repetition of the static free-entry game, because a firm's operation in an earlier period gives it "priority" for serving the industry later. 5 Both of these specifications require upper bounds on the set of possible prices to accomodate the case where N = 1. In practice, this case never arises in our calculations.
Parameter Possible Values β 1.05 Ramey, and Spulber (1996) and show that π(N ) = (1 − ψ)π(1) for N > 1 in the unique (mixed-strategy) symmetric equilibrium. We arbitrarily set ψ = 1/3. At this value, the numerical examples we consider always have at least one firm serving the industry. Sutton (1992) refers to the slope of π(N ) as the "toughness" of competition. The three specifications' slopes are O(N 2 ), O(N 3 ) and O(1), so we refer to them below as the cases of intermediate, high, and low toughness. For all three specifications, we consider three values of , which equate static per-firm profits with 3, 4, or 5 firms to κ when C = 1. For reference, Table 1 reports all of the possible values we give to the model's parameters.
A Specific Example
It is helpful to have a specific example in mind when considering the results of all of the experiments. For this leading example, we set ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.3, ϕ = 2/5, and π(N ) = 125/N 2 .
With these parameters, at most six firms serve the industry. Figure 4 plots their value functions. Its bottom panel displays the value of a sixth entrant. This monotonically increases with demand. The value of continuation exceeds the cost of entry if ln C t > 0.81, and it equals zero if ln C t ≤ 0.54. The next panel above it plots the value of a fifth entrant. This has the same structure as the plot of the incumbent's value function in Figure 3 . The upper branch corresponds to the value function when the industry initially has five firms, and the lower branch gives the fifth firm's value after the entrant of a sixth firm. The arrows indicate that the fifth firm's value drops when the sixth firm enters and jumps after its exit. The stochastic process for ln C t does not satisfy Definition 2. Nevertheless, the entry and exit thresholds of 0.07 and −0.15 characterize this firm's decisions. The figure's higher panels plot the value functions for the earlier entrants. Each value function has one additional branch, which corresponds to that firm being the most recent entrant. As with the fifth entrant, thresholds give the fourth entrant's entry and continuation policies. The payoff to entering as the first, second, or third entrant always exceeds the cost of entry, so their value functions equal each other and their entry and exit thresholds both equalĈ. Consequentially at least three firms always serve the industry. 6 It is possible for the value of a first, second, or third entrant to fall below the sunk cost of entry, but this only occurs if both (i) a fourth firm enters and (ii) C t subsequently falls.
To measure the impact of barriers to entry on equilibrium dynamics, we concentrate on the number of firms' average and standard deviation in the equilibrium's ergodic distribution. In this example, the average number of firms is 4.56 and the standard deviation is 0.53. The barrier to entry we examine consists adding 2/5 to the fixed cost of entry for each firm with an entry rank above the average number of firms in the original equilibrium. Because we have normalized the fixed cost paid every five years to equal one, this corresponds to adding two years of fixed cost to the sunk entry cost. In the example, the resulting entry costs are ϕ(N ) = 2/5 + I{N ≥ 5}2/5. With this modification, the example's average and standard deviation for the number of firms drop to 4.45 and 0.51. In this example, the intuition from the duopoly case that raising a barrier to entry stabilizes the number of firms holds good, but it is not very quantitatively important. Furthermore, the decrease in the average number of firms conforms to the intuition from static models that barriers to entry increase concentration.
As the intuition from the duopoly case suggests, increasing sunk costs for the fifth and sixth entrants encourages a fourth entrant. The relevant entry and exit thresholds drop from −0.89 and −1.09 to −0.92 and −1.11. However, the change effects the average number of firms little, because the probability of at least four firms operating is only slightly less than one. The entry thresholds for the fifth and sixth entrants rise from 0.07 and 0.81 to 0.23 and 0.98. By construction, the sixth (and final) entrant's exit threshold remains unchanged. Perhaps more surprisingly, the fifth entrant's exit threshold also remains unchanged. This reflects the combination of a discrete state space with a very small value of imposing this substantial barrier to entry on a sixth firm. Table 2 begins the presentation of the experimental results. For the case with intermediate toughness of price competition (π(N ) = N/(N − 1)), it reports the average and standard deviation for N t from the ergodic distribution for all combinations of the parameter values we consider. Its inspection reveals four principle determinants of the number of firms. The two obvious ones, demand and the cost of entry, operate as expected. The third and fourth are the demand shock's persistence and variance. Increasing ρ from 0.8 to 1.0 can increase the average number of firms by as much as 1.81.
Experimental Results
7 With low sunk costs, increasing σ changes the average of N very little. However when ϕ = 0.4 increasing σ from 0.1 to 0.3 can increase the average number of firms by as much as 0.48 firms. This arises from the well-known effect of uncertainty on the real option's embedded in a firm's value explained in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . The most notable feature of Table 2 's second panel is the relatively small impact that raising ϕ has on the standard deviation of N t . Table 3 reports the changes in the number of firms' average and standard deviation from raising barriers to entry. For each parameter combination, the experiment is the same as was conducted with the leading example. That is, the cost of entry was increased by 2/5 for entrants with ranks greater than the averages reported in Table 2 . In all of the reported experiments, raising barriers to entry lowers the average number of firms. The largest decrease is 0.63 firms, and the smallest was 0.04 firms. Although the analysis of the duopoly case indicated that barriers to entry could raise the average number of firms, the "strategic" entry-encouraging effect of barriers to entry does little to offset the "direct" entrydeterring effects. In all but one of the experiments, the entry barrier decreased the standard deviation of N . The largest reduction is 0.49 firms. The single increase in the standard deviation equals 0.01 firms. Any proposed theorem stating that the standard deviation must decrease with barriers to entry would be incorrect for the oligopoly case, but the intuition from the duopoly case proved correct in most of the experiments.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the case of high toughness of competition (π(N ) = /N 2 ). Comparing Table 4 with Table 2 shows that the number of firms' average and standard deviation both tend to decline with the toughness of competition. However, the only quantitatively important differences between these results and those obtained when π(N ) = (N − 1)/N occur when either ρ = 1 or σ = 3. The similarity between the two specifications' average number of firms arises largely by construction, because we adjust along with the specification for π(N ) to obtain a given level of concentration in a static model without sunk costs. The similarity between the standard deviations from the two specifications is somewhat more surprising, and it suggests that learning about the toughness of competition from dynamic entry and exit data requires very persistent changes in demand. Increasing the toughness of price competition changes the effects of imposing a barrier to entry only slightly, except when ρ = 1. The results for the case of low toughness of competition are in Tables 6 and 7 . Comparing these with the baseline results with intermediate toughness of competition confirms the impression that raising the toughness of competition stabilizes industry structure and only slightly changes the effects of imposing a barrier to entry.
We draw two broad conclusions from this large set of numerical examples. First, increasing late entrants' sunk costs does indeed reduce the average number of operating firms. The intuition from the duopoly case's analytic results -which highlight potentially offsetting Table 7 : Effects of Imposing Barriers to Entry when π(N ) = (1 + 2 × I{N = 1}) effects of barriers to entry on the equilibrium number of firms -are misleading in these numerical examples. Second, the intuition that increasing barriers to entry stabilizes the industry structure holds good in all but a handful of examples.
A First-In First-Out Example
The above analysis heavily leverages the Last-In First-Out assumption. Although we find this assumption natural for the reasons given above, confirmation that our results can be obtained without it enhances confidence in their conclusions. Here, we present one such case which uses the stochastic process for C from the paper-and-pencil example. We replace the assumption that older firms make their continuation decisions first with its opposite, and we focus on equilibria in which older firms exit before their younger competitors. We refer to this as the First-In First-Out example. As in the original model, de novo entry decisions follow incumbents' continuation decisions. So thatŇ = 2, we set π(3) = 0. We also limit entry into the industry to at most one firm per period.
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We continue to denote a firm's rank with R, but the FIFO assumption implies that a firm's rank can decrease during its lifetime. To begin, consider the continuation decision of an duopolist with rank 1. This firm rationally expects its rival to not exit before it does, so the corresponding dynamic programming problem is identical to the problem of a duopolist with rank 2 under LIFO.
Here, C 1 (1) is the largest value of C that sets v S (1, C, 1) to zero and
By construction, this value function is identical to v S (0, C, 2) from the paper-and-pencil LIFO example.
The decisions of a potential or actual incumbent monopolist depend on their expectations for further entry. To calculate an equilibrium we suppose that all future potential duopolists actually enter if and only if C > C 2 . We then place conditions on the parameters that guarantee that the best response by a current potential duopolist to such a strategy is to enter if and only if C exceeds a threshold C 2 . We then demonstrate that there is a unique value of this threshold that is its own best response. We denote this equilibrium threshold with C 2 . Finally, we characterize the entry decisions of a potential monopolist given this equilibrium duopoly entry policy.
Begin with a given value for C 2 . With this, we can specify the closely related dynamic programming problems of an incumbent monopolist and of an incumbent duopolist with rank 2. Their value functions satisfy
otherwise,
As above,
The threshold C 1 (1) is that defined from the older incumbent duopolist's problem above, and the threshold C 1 (0) is the greatest value of C such that v S (0, C, 1) = 0. These value functions allows us to consider the play of the game when there is a single incumbent. If C < C 1 (0), the incumbent exits; and the potential entrant stays out of the market. If C 1 (0) < C < C 1 (1), then continuation is optimal for the incumbent if and only if the potential entrant's strategy dictates inactivity. Suppose that both the incumbent and potential entrant choose to be active. The entrant's expected payoff to this is
If C does not change before the next period, the current incumbent will exit and the new entrant will become an incumbent monopolist. The firm's profit in this case equals duopoly profits plus the value of continuing as a monopolist. If C does change, the firm still earns duopoly profits in the next period, but the continuation value depends on the new value of C. If this payoff is positive for some value of C, then entry when C equals that value dominates staying out of the industry. The incumbent monopolist would rationally anticipate this action and exit. Suppose that this payoff is positive when C = C 1 (1), but that v(0, C, 2) < ϕ(2) for C slightly above C 1 (1). Then, given that all future potential entrants use threshold C 2 to decide whether or not to enter an already occupied industry, the best response of the current entrant is to not follow a threshold rule at all. Because we are searching for an equilibrium in threshold rules, we eliminate this possibility with the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The payoff to entering as a duopolist when C = C 1 and C 2 =Č is less than zero.
Because ϕ(N ) plays no role in the construction of v S (0, C, 1) and v S (1, C, 1), Assumption 1 places a (possibly trivial) lower bound on ϕ(2). With Assumption 1 in place, the incumbent chooses to continue and the potential entrant stays out of the market when C 1 (0) < C < C 1 (1).
The final case to consider is when C > C 1 (1), so continuation is a dominant strategy for the incumbent. Given the incumbent's decision to continue, the branch of v(0, C, 2) to the right of C 1 (1) gives the payoff from entry. This is linear and increasing in C, and Assumption 1 implies that it is below ϕ(2) for C close to C 1 (1). Define C 2 (C 2 ) to equal the greatest value of C such that v(0, C, 2) ≤ ϕ(2). Creating a duopoly through entry is optimal if and only if C exceeds this threshold.
Figure 5 plots C 2 (C 2 ) for an example which satisfies Assumption 1. Increasing C 2 increases the value of entering as a duopolist, so C 2 (·) is weakly decreasing. It is not difficult to demonstrate that it is also continuous, so it has a unique fixed point, C 2 . This is the only possible equilibrium entry threshold for a second duopolist in an equilibrium with a FIFO strategy. an empty industry will be a monopolist for one period. If C ≤ C 2 , the firm's payoff in the next period is identical to a similarly situated incumbent monopolist. Hence, the value of entering in this case is v(0, C, 1). If instead C > C 2 , then this firm expects to become a duopolist following the next period if C remains unchanged. It is possible that the resulting payoff could fall below ϕ(1), in which case equilibrium entry rule would not follow a threshold rule. In the following, we assume that this does not occur.
Assumption 2. The following inequality holds.
Because ϕ(1) played no role in the construction of any of the value functions on the lefthand side, this is a simple (and positive) upper bound on ϕ(1). It guarantees that there is a single value of C which equates the payoff to entry as a monopolist with ϕ(1). This is the monopoly entry threshold, C 1 (0). 10 The solid black line represents the value of a firm with rank 1. As before, it has monopoly and duopoly branches. They intersect horizontal axis at C 1 (0) and C 1 (1). the grey line gives the value of a firm with rank 2. This is slightly above the rank 1 duopoly branch and far below the rank 1 monopoly branch. Suppose that initially N = 2. If C passes below C 1 (1), then the older firm exits and the younger firm's value jumps to the rank 1 monopoly branch. 11 If C then jumps above C 2 , another firm enters and the original firm's value falls to the rank 1 duopoly branch. We are now prepared to examine the consequences of raising ϕ(2) while holding ϕ(1) constant. Increasing ϕ(2) directly increases the function g(C 2 ), so it also raises C 2 . This in turn raises the rank 1 value function's monopoly branch (v S (0, C, 1)) and leaves its duopoly branch (v S (1, C, 1)) unchanged. From this, the following proposition follows.
Proposition 5. Increasing ϕ(2) alone increases C 2 , decreases C 1 (0) and C 1 (0), and leaves
This proposition is nearly identical to its predecessor from the general analysis of duopoly with a symmetric LIFO strategy. There, C 1 and C 1 play the same role as C 1 (0) and C 1 (0) here, while the FIFO analogue of C 2 is C 1 (1). Extending the propositions from the LIFO duopoly to this FIFO case thus requires only relabelling the relevant thresholds. For the sake of completeness, we state them here.
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Proposition 6. Define S j (C, N ) as in Proposition 2. Raising ϕ(2) decreases S j (C, 0), weakly increases S j (C, 1), and leaves S j (C, 2) unchanged.
Proposition 7. Define P j (N , C, N ) as in Proposition 3. Raising ϕ(2) lowers P j (0, C, N ) and P j (2, C, N ).
Corollary 2. Denote the probability of N firms serving the industry in the ergodic distribution for (C, N ) with P (N ). Raising ϕ(2) decreases P (0) and P (2) and increases P (1).
Proposition 8. Suppose that C 1 (0) <Č and C 1 (0) =Ĉ. Then increasing ϕ(2) decreases both E[ER t ] and E[XR t ], where the expectations are calculated using the ergodic distribution for (C, N ).
It is somewhat remarkable that the same results hold good for the opposite extreme assumptions of LIFO and FIFO entry and exit for this particular stochastic process. This reflects the robustness of two economic principles from finite-stage games. First, raising the cost of late entry directly deters that entry. Second, this deterrence indirectly encourages early entry. Of course, there are specifications for the dynamic game of entry and exit other than LIFO and FIFO, so showing that the analytic duopoly results are robust to this change does not demonstrate that they always hold good. Nevertheless, it does show that a LIFO pattern for entry and exit is not necessary for this paper's principle results.
Related Literature
This paper's analysis implicitly relies upon a great deal of previous work . This section serves to acknowledge this dependence explicitly. There are two areas of previous research that are particularly important for us.
Entry Deterrence
Barriers to entry play a prominent role in the structure-conduct-performance framework, because no firm can maintain market power without an impediment to competition. Subsequent work using game-theoretic tools has addressed the same issue by examining incumbents' ability to deter entry. Dixit (1980) pioneered this with a demonstration that an incumbent's investment can deter entry by committing the firm to tough post-entry price competition, and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) continued this by showing how actions with no intrinsic dynamic consequences can nevertheless deter entry by credibly signalling the incumbent's payoff-relevant private information. Much work has followed this delineating the tools available to incumbents for entry deterrence. Unlike that work, we take as given the existence of an economic entry barrier (defined as in McAfee et al. (2004) ); and we focus instead on such a barrier's dynamic consequences.
Competitive Industry Dynamics
We are not the first to analyze the influence of sunk costs on industry structure in an infinitehorizon framework. Hopenhayn (1992) does so in a model of competitive industry dynamics with atomistic price taking firms. He shows that increasing the sunk cost of entry lowers entry and exit rates in his model's stationary equilibrium. This result is reminiscent of our Proposition 4, but the two results reflect entirely different mechanisms. In our model, raising a second entrant's sunk cost raises that firm's entry threshold and leaves the exit threshold unchanged. The reduction in entry and exit rates arises from the greater distance that C t must fall before inducing that firm to exit. In Hopenhayn's model, raising the sunk cost of entry directly raises the competitive equilibrium price, which in turn lowers firms' common exit threshold.
Models of industry dynamics that assume either perfect competition (such as Jovanovic's, 1982 or Hopenhayn's, 1992 or monopolistic competition without strategic interaction (such as Fishman and Rob's, 2003) have proven invaluable in the empirical analysis of firm and industry evolution, because they replicate the large simultaneous entry and exit rates documented by Dunne et al. (1988) . These models abstract from strategic interaction, so they are very tractable. However, they imply nothing for the evolution of oligopolistic markets. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Campbell (2006) have documented that observations from U.S. cities' retail trade industries generally conflict with these non-strategic models' cross-market predictions, so further analysis of those industries apparently requires consideration of oligopoly. This paper's model can serve as the foundation of such a model of industry dynamics if we consider a given industry with many firms to be a collection of many oligopolies.
Conclusion
The phrase "barriers to entry" has a rich history in industrial organization, much of which revolves around its imprecise definition. We adopt a specific definition -sunk costs that only late entrants pay -and examine their effects on oligopoly dynamics in a particular Markovperfect equilibrium. In principle, exogenously imposing a barrier to entry can either raise or lower the number of competitors, but it always lowers it in the hundreds of numerical examples we consider. In the analytically tractable duopoly case, imposing a barrier to entry stabilizes industry structure, and this prediction holds good in the numerical examples with more than two firms.
This positive analysis of barriers to entry has prepared the way for a fully dynamic normative analysis. We expect that the tradeoff between productive and allocative efficiency -familiar from static merger analysis -will lie at the core of this undertaking. However, the infinite horizon setting might yield surprising dynamic effects. This normative evaluation awaits future work.
Appendix: Proofs of Results in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 2. We begin with S j (C, 0). This equals Pr[ j i=0 {C t+j ≤ C 1 }], which is clearly increasing in C 1 . Next, note that S j (C, 2) = Pr[ j i=1 {C t+j > C 2 }], which is decreasing in C 2 . Finally, S j (C, 1) = Pr[ j i=1 {C 1 < C t+j ≤ C 2 }], which decreases with C 1 and increases with C 2 . The conclusion follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider P j (0, C, N ). If N > 0, then the event N t+j = 0 equals
That is, the state must pass below C 1 at some date t + i and thereafter remain below C 1 until t + j. If N = 0, then the event N t+j = 0 equals A B, where
Similarly, if N < 2, then the event N t+j = 2 equals
{C t+j ≥ C 2 } {C t+j ≥ C 2 }, and if N = 2, this event equals C D, where
The sets A and B are clearly both increasing in C 1 and C 1 , and both C and D are decreasing in C 2 and C 2 . The conclusion that P j (0, C, N ) and P j (2, C, N ) decrease as ϕ(2) increases follows immediately from this and Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the industry begins with a particular (C, N ) pair at time 0. The exit rate equals 1/2 at date t. Without loss of generality, suppose that N = 1. Then N EG t = 1/2 if and only if the event C t C t ≤ C 2 occurs, where C t is the event C defined in the proof of Proposition 3 with t set equal to zero and j set equal to t . This set is clearly decreasing in C 2 , so we have that E 0 [N EG t ] is decreasing in ϕ(2), where the expectations operator denotes conditioning on the initial values of C and N . Taking the limit as t → ∞ yields the result that the expected value of N EG t calculated using the ergodic distribution decreases with ϕ(2). The conclusion then follows from the fact that E[P OS t ] = E[N EG t ] in the ergodic distribution.
